DURHAM -- Today the state Supreme Court is scheduled to consider the law of adoption in a landmark case.
Boseman v. Jarrell involves partners who both wanted to parent a child. The case has received attention in part because of Julia Boseman's position as a state senator.
After Melissa Jarrell had the child through artificial insemination, the two women explored how Boseman could legally adopt the child. Because they could not marry, they used a statutory method known as "direct placement" adoption, where the biological parent is normally required to give up her parental rights to the child. However, rather than terminating her parental rights, Jarrell employed a legal theory that has been successfully advanced in other states. She waived the requirement that she terminate her parental rights, allowing her to continue to be a parent and allowing Boseman to adopt the child.
As a result, the child now has two legal parents. Many North Carolina children have been adopted this way.
When the couple's relationship ended, Jarrell tried unsuccessfully in District Court to have the adoption declared void. She then appealed to the N.C. Court of Appeals; this court also upheld the adoption. The case is now being heard by the Supreme Court. If that court upholds this adoption, it will follow the state's longtime policies of assigning and encouraging responsibility for its children.
The Court of Appeals stated several reasons for its ruling: the legislature had greatly restricted final orders of adoption, making them virtually impossible to attack; the stated intention of the N.C. General Statutes was one of advocacy for the adoption of minor children; and the "needs, interests and rights" of the minor child, as directed by the legislature, rose above those of either parent. A closer look at our state statutes shows a proactive effort by the legislature to encourage responsibility for the children of our state.
N.C.G.S. § 48-2-607 addresses the limited methods by which adoption decrees may be attacked in the state, none of which are applicable in the Boseman case. One of the reasons this statute exists is that it was a primary intent of the legislature to have finality in adoption cases. Further, the intent of the legislature with regard to the construction of adoption law is clear: "This [Adoption] Chapter shall be liberally construed and applied to promote its underlying purposes and policies."
There are many statutory examples where the General Assembly recognizes that two parents are beneficial for children. An early one, the chapter on bastardy, covers ways that illegitimate children are supported and legitimized. Others include procedures for stepparents to adopt minor stepchildren, and for former parents to readopt minor children. Another concerns artificial insemination, where a statute makes clear that any child born as a "result of heterologous artificial insemination" is considered "the same as a naturally conceived legitimate child of the husband and wife."
Even if dead, a petitioning spouse can adopt. Pursuant to statute, if one of the two prospective adopting petitioners dies before a final decree of adoption is entered, the adoption is still allowed to proceed, and the name of the deceased parent is listed on the adoption certificate.
Nearly 20 states expressly allow adoption by a second parent by statute or case law; this list includes states in which the judiciary has examined cases similar to Boseman v. Jarrell. In Indiana, Pennsylvania, Illinois and Delaware, where the appellate courts have recognized second-parent adoption, the relevant laws are analogous to North Carolina. These courts, like many others, recognized the absurdity of not allowing another able and willing parent to assume legal responsibility for a child.
A Vermont court summed the issue in this manner: "the intent of the legislature was to protect the security of family units by defining the legal rights and responsibilities of children who find themselves in circumstances that do not include two biological parents. ... [W]e cannot conclude that the legislature ever meant to terminate the parental rights of a biological parent who intended to continue raising a child with the help of a partner. Such a narrow construction would produce the unreasonable and irrational result of defeating adoptions that are otherwise indisputably in the best interests of children."
Consistent with legislative policy, our state Supreme Court should decide this case by affirming this adoption, and continuing to assign legal responsibility of children to willing adults.
Lydia E. Lavelle is an assistant professor at N.C. Central University School of Law.
