RALEIGH - The Bush administration's justification for continued operations in Iraq -- that it has become the central front in the global war on terrorism -- leaves almost no rhetorical space for an effective counterargument (the opposition party has been labeled the "Defeatocrats" and is said to be working on behalf of "al-Qaeda types"). As long as the enterprise in Iraq is deemed central to American national security, the only alternative to continued military operations is to "let the terrorists win."

In particular, accusations that critics of the administration advocate "cutting and running" and ignore the need to "honor the dead by continuing the fight" have been only weakly rebutted. While each of these statements is based on transparently faulty logic, they are persuasive because both advocate an irrational attempt to recoup "sunk costs" (blood and treasure that has been expended and will not be returned regardless of the outcome in Iraq) -- a well-known psychological bias.

Overvaluing consistency is another psychological bias adroitly exploited by the Bush administration to maintain control over the debate. Critics from both parties are hamstrung by their votes for a congressional resolution authorizing the war and their fear of being labeled "flip-floppers."

The administration's rhetorical dominance stands in marked contrast to polling data suggesting that a majority of Americans long ago soured on the conflict. With the exception of a single poll on the eve of the 2004 presidential elections, a majority of Americans have consistently said that the benefits of the Iraq war are not worth the costs.

Facts have also accumulated to conspire against the administration's preferred frame. Abu Musab al-Zarqawi of al-Qaeda in Iraq is dead, Iraqis are killing each other at a much greater rate (approximately 3,400 per month) than they are killing U.S. troops, and American generals have admitted the possibility of a "civil war" fought along sectarian lines.

The generals' frank admission has created a temporally limited opportunity for critics of the war to reframe the conflict and begin to credibly discuss disengagement alternatives.

Republican Sen. John Warner of Virginia apparently seized upon this potential when he recently speculated that the president might need a new statutory authorization from Congress legitimizing American involvement in a nascent Iraqi civil war. Acknowledgment of a civil war would truncate the U.S. intervention into three phases: a major combat operations victory, a counterinsurgency campaign draw, and a civil war of which many Americans want no part and legislators did not approve.

This recognition offers an opportunity (for either side of the aisle) to reframe the war as a humanitarian intervention with questionable prospects for success. Ample research has shown that Americans are less tolerant of casualties in this type of war -- suggesting that they might be persuaded the time has come to begin the process of disengaging from Iraq.

Reframing Iraq as a civil war could allow Congressional critics to distance themselves from earlier votes authorizing the war and win over a public that is frustrated but reluctant to admit failure. Further, this new frame should ameliorate the impact of sunk costs by creating a new mental "account" for Iraq -- the "civil-war" phase that requires new expenditures of blood and treasure. Finally, it could also counter the "Pottery Barn rule" argument by emphasizing the cost expended during the "counterinsurgency phase" and the limits on America's moral obligation to the Iraqi elite that have chosen the path of sectarian conflict.

Attempts to reframe the American involvement in Iraq will inevitably generate an aggressive rhetorical response. Accusations of abandoning the Iraqi people, surrendering to the terrorists and enabling a humanitarian catastrophe will be leveled from critics on the left and the right. A successful reframing of the Iraq war must be combined with a disengagement strategy that addresses these concerns, but realistically acknowledges that public support for the war is waning and the Bush administration does not appear inclined to commit the resources needed to turn things around.

The lengthy search for an "honorable exit" from Vietnam stemmed from a stubborn unwillingness to admit defeat and an inability to reframe our effort there, particularly given past rhetoric regarding the centrality of the mission. The public is ready to re-evaluate the U.S. involvement in Iraq, but it can't discern an exit strategy so long as Iraq is viewed through the lens of the war on terrorism. It is time for leading critics of the war to step up and show them the way out.

(William A. Boettcher is an associate professor and Michael D. Cobb is an assistant professor in the School of Public and International Affairs at N.C. State University.)