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It is not just that the Kimberley Process risks being a fig leaf. It also can have important costs. For one thing, it may enable DeBeers, leading the charge to keep out blood diamonds, to secure its quasi-monopoly. The Kimberley Process favors large-scale industrial diamond mines over the close to 1 million artisanal diamond diggers largely outside the control of government. The process also institutes a self-monitoring process that, if abused, can keep out new entrants to challenge DeBeers' market dominance. Some recent reports that blood diamonds are being smuggled into neighboring countries threaten to exclude otherwise conflict-free diamonds from reaching the global market.

Delegating the solution to the industry can also create some perverse incentives. An image-oriented industry player, such as DeBeers, could be motivated to find symbolic fixes. There is something very comforting to a consumer about receiving a certificate.

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The movie should bring the important problem of blood diamonds to the public consciousness. But it should also prompt debate over finding effective solutions, such as brokering an end to the domestic conflicts that fuel the illicit trade. The problem that the Kimberley dialogue presents is that all parties to the debate are now firmly invested in the proposed solution rather than addressing the underlying problems. That is a fairly typical problem in the world of corporate social responsibility.

The collaboration between DeBeers and NGOs is the paradigmatic "Baptists and bootleggers" coalition. Despite the industry's sterling intentions, industry-led coalitions have their limitations, and the greatest threat is that doubtful solutions offer excuses to think that the problem is solved.

(Barak Richman has written several articles on the diamond industry. Joost Pauwelyn is an expert on international trade law. Both are professors at the Duke University School of Law.)

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