Sports

Going to WAR: An In-Season Assessment Tool to Replicate ADP ?

Back when we were all drafting our teams in the cold winter - oh how we remember those days fondly - we held on to ADP like a compass in foreign territory. It would guide us and lead us to the promised land.

But now, at the end of May - Fernando Tatis has no homeruns, Jordan Walker is an MVP candidate, and we have no idea what Nolan McLean is doing - we need in-season measures and dashboards to navigate suddenly treacherous territories.

We know SS is deep and we all reached for an outfielder early in our drafts. But how, statistically, are the positions faring compared to both our own expectations, and against one another?

To answer that question, I turned to WAR, or Wins Above Replacement, to assess positional depth at this point in the season. It confirmed a lot of what I knew but also guided me to some new strategies.

Why Go To WAR?

 Bryce Harper illustrates how WAR and offense rankings diverge. © Lucas Boland-Imagn Images
Bryce Harper illustrates how WAR and offense rankings diverge. © Lucas Boland-Imagn Images © Lucas Boland-Imagn Images

WAR is not a perfect statistic and is often criticized by old school proponents of daytime World Series games and staying off their lawn. For purposes of this exercise, WAR is not perfect, but gives us a general stat we can use. WAR measures offense (including baserunning) and defense which produce a couple of out-of-expectation rankings that will have you rolling your eyes.

By the WAR measure, Bryce Harper is merely the 14th best first baseman in the league. When we ignore defense and use only the FanGraphs "Offense" ranks (hitting and baserunning), he jumps to number 5. Conversely, Pete Crow-Armstrong is the 11th OF by WAR, but when you measure the Offense ranks only, PCA falls to number 40. Those are extreme gaps, but it's important to know exactly what you are measuring.

So we'll press on, keeping the notion of checking the offensive ranks in the back of our minds.

I built my experiment on the most common 10-team league structure. I decided to measure the WAR of the top 20 catchers (for those old school two-catcher leagues), the top 15 at each infield position (assuming everyone starts one and then the 11-15th ranked at those positions would go to CI/MI), and the top 60 OF to allow for extra hitters for DH/Utility spots.

What Did the Numbers Say?

Let's look at the top 10 players at each position, as measured by WAR. I took these 10 and averaged their WAR numbers.

PositionAvg. WAR

OF

1.982

SS

1.818

2B

1.687

1B

1.607

C

1.446

3B

1.441

No surprises here, other than my own mild surprise to see 2B ahead of 1B, which doesn't feel right. Catchers being as low as they are was a bit of a surprise but considering frequent days off, it wasn't a huge shock.

It gets interesting when you expand the positional WAR beyond the top 10. I realize not every league plays 5 OF, but for those that do, this breakdown was fascinating. I measured 60 OF for two reasons - first, many teams look to fill the Utility/DH position with an OF and second, there were only 61 "qualified" OF, which was a red flag for me. That signaled a lot of platoons and made me eager to see this next chart.

This is the average WAR by the overall groups I measured: 20 catchers, 15 at each infield position and the 60 players in OF. Here's what the numbers said.

PositionSampleAvg. WAR

SS

Top 15

1.523

1B

Top 15

1.395

2B

Top 15

1.326

3B

Top 15

1.133

C

Top 20

1.063

OF

Top 60

0.855

Look at that dropoff in OF. I assumed C would drop off a bit, and that SS would hold steady. But the OF numbers were a shock, and when I do this measure in late summer, I'm sure there will be fewer full-time OF and even more platoons. But I know what needs measuring next.

So I went to work studying the OF dropoff. Here are the OF measured by tiers of 10s:

OF TierFront/Back PlayersAvg. WAR

1–10

Carroll -- Trout

1.982

11–20

PCA -- Cruz

1.322

21–30

Suzuki -- Dubón

0.930

31–40

Steer -- Johnston

0.667

41–50

Benge -- Church

0.382

51–60

Mitchell -- Friedl

-0.007

Those drops were dramatic, and fast. The 21-30 group produces less than half the value, on average, as the top 10. The values steadily fall until the last group posting a "negative James Bond" WAR. These numbers suggest that if you drafted two OF with your top two picks, you're a little bit ahead of the game, but if you waited even for your second OF, you might be struggling more than you imagined.

Now I'm going to calculate the WAR averages of the 11-15 infielders:

PositionAvg. WAR

1B

0.971

SS

0.933

2B

0.694

3B

0.517

The 3B drop-off from spots 11-15 is brutal. The middle infield tail holds up significantly better. So if we were drafting with this knowledge, we would likely grab a 2nd first baseman before even thinking about 3B again. But the move might have been to draft two top-10 third basemen and take an 11-15 first baseman for greater total value.

So What Have We (Really) Learned and What Can We Do With It?

 Lawrence Butler represents elite outfield value amid dramatic positional dropoffs. James A. Pittman-Imagn Images
Lawrence Butler represents elite outfield value amid dramatic positional dropoffs. James A. Pittman-Imagn Images James A. Pittman-Imagn Images

We are seeing that positional scarcity is being redefined in 2026, and most fantasy managers are still using the 2022 draft board in their heads. At SS and 1B, you can afford to roster an 11-15th ranked player and still do fine. Doing that at 2B, and particularly at 3B, could be a death sentence for your team.

My practical advice is that you need to exploit the fact that the trade market is mispriced right now. We can see exactly where, and here is what I'd do about it.

Buy third base aggressively. Managers rostering Bregman, Gorman, Riley, or Chapman are frustrated and quietly shopping. Meanwhile McGonigle and Muncy are outperforming their draft-day prices by a mile. Find the manager who drafted Witt and De La Cruz and is hiding Muncy on their bench behind a crowded infield. Offer your 25th-ranked outfielder and a middling closer to shake him loose. They'll text the group chat about what a steal they made. Let them.

Be skeptical of outfield trade asks. Managers with five OF roster spots feel flush with talent. The WAR data says they're holding Monopoly money past the top 20. If someone wants 1B or SS value for their 25th-ranked outfielder, pass. The supply of 0.8 WAR OFs is enormous. Sell OF depth. Don't buy it.

If you have a top-10 OF, that's your trade chip. The drop from tier one (1.982) to tier two (1.322) is the sharpest cliff at any position. Your Carroll or Judge has more trade value than the other manager thinks you know. If you need SS or C help, move the outfielder now.

Catcher is the stealth buy. The "catcher is weak" narrative has a decade of inertia behind it, and it's wrong in 2026. Langeliers, Baldwin, and Jeffers are performing at 1B/2B top-10 levels. If your catcher is outside the top 10 - really, anything below 0.85 WAR - start shopping before the rest of your league figures this out.

Before any trade, check Off, not WAR. PCA is 11th in WAR and 40th in offensive value. That gap exists across the OF. When you're selling, cite WAR. When you're buying, dig into Off first.

Work the 3B and C waiver wires. Frustrated managers drop struggling catchers and third basemen after cold weeks. Given how brutal the 3B 11-15 tier is, there is almost certainly a usable upgrade sitting there right now.

Don't sell SS depth. The SS 11-15 tier averages 0.933 WAR - the healthiest tail in the infield. Your backup shortstop has real value. Hold him, wait for the right offer, and let the 3B-desperate managers come to you.

Questions and Answers

Why use WAR as the positional comparison tool?

WAR is not perfect, but it provides a broad measure of value by combining offense, baserunning, and defense to compare positional depth.

What position showed the biggest surprise in the data?

Outfield showed the sharpest drop once the sample expanded beyond the top tier, while catcher held up better than expected.

What did the 11–15 infield tiers reveal?

Shortstop and first base remained relatively stable, while third base showed the steepest value decline.

How should managers apply this information?

Trade into third base value, be cautious paying for mid-tier outfielders, and use offensive metrics alongside WAR before making moves.

Copyright 2026 The Arena Group, Inc. All Rights Reserved

This story was originally published May 21, 2026 at 4:26 PM.

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